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I. INTRODUCTION
A significant number of state and federal court cases were adjudi-
cated involving environmental legal issues during the Survey pe-
riod. These cases provide insights to those who litigate
environmental claims, perform due diligence in business transactions, ad-
vise clients in regulatory and permitting actions, and otherwise counsel
clients in environmental matters. The cases include significant rulings on
the ability to recover environmental remediation expenses, the applica-
tion of administrative and constitutional issues in the context of environ-
mental law, criminal environmental prosecution, claims for property
damages and personal injury, and endangered species issues. In the Texas
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Legislature, significant legislation was enacted, including a new Municipal
Settings Designation program allowing parties to avoid cleaning up
groundwater to drinking water standards when no one will drink the rele-
vant groundwater and a program designed to create a fund to pay for
remediation of releases of solvents from dry cleaning operations. In sum,
significant new environmental laws were enacted in Texas, and important
court decisions were issued during the Survey period.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. CHALLENGES OF AGENCY RULE-MAKING
1. Standing to Seek Review of Agency Rules
Some of the more important decisions during the Survey period arose
from challenges of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
rules and decisions regarding plans to address the failure of certain met-
ropolitan areas in Texas to meet the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards (NAAQS). In one of the most significant cases, BCCA Appeal
Group v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,' EPA chal-
lenged the standing of the BCCA Group and of Brazoria County to seek
review of EPA's approval of a state implementation plan (SIP) 2 that the
State of Texas submitted to reduce ozone levels in the Houston-Galves-
ton non-attainment area under the Clean Air Act. 3
To establish standing, the petitioner must demonstrate "(1) it has suf-
fered an 'injury in fact' that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's con-
duct and not 'some third party not before the court,' and (3) it is
'likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.' '" 4
EPA claimed that BCCA's injury did not meet the second or third ele-
ments above in that the TCEQ had adopted the control measures in
question, not EPA, and, therefore, the control measures are not fairly
traceable to EPA, and the injury would not be redressed by a favorable
decision. The court reasoned that, although EPA's role in approving the
SIP is limited in that it must approve any plan that meets the minimum
statutory requirements, BCCA had standing to challenge EPA's decision
regarding the SIP's compliance with the minimum requirements of the
Clean Air Act, because its injury would be redressable by a favorable
court decision.5
In this case, EPA also asserted that BCCA had waived its arguments by
failing to raise or properly present them during the comment period.6
1. BCCA Appeal Group v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir.
2004).
2. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,160 (Nov. 14, 2001).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
4. BCCA Appeal Group, 355 F.3d at 825 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
5. Id. at 826.
6. Id. at 827.
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EPA contended that BCCA failed to alert EPA to the relevant portions
of the deposition transcripts, hearing transcripts, and exhibits related to a
state court action that BCCA submitted as comments and that BCCA
failed to explain how those voluminous materials related to BCCA's spe-
cific objections in its comments.7 The court disagreed, finding that
BCCA was a meaningful participant in the rulemaking proceeding in that
it sufficiently clarified its position for EPA and identified the issues to
which the material was relevant. 8 In contrast, the court found that Brazo-
ria County had failed to raise its arguments during the rulemaking pro-
cess that certain provisions of the SIP violated state law. The court cited
the general rule that a court will not rule on questions of law that were
not presented to the agency during the notice and comment period and
held that Brazoria County waived its argument. 9
2. Challenges to Implementation of the Federal Clean Air Act by the
State of Texas
At least three significant challenges to Texas's implementation of the
federal Clean Air Act were decided during the review period. These
cases were decided by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In all but one respect, the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA's actions, leaving
Texas's programs intact and showing a considerable amount of deference
to EPA's decision making and decision making process. 10
a. Petitions to Review the Houston SIP
The BCCA Appeal Group" case was a consolidation of petitions for
direct review of EPA's decision approving the Texas SIP developed to
attain the NAAQS for ozone in the Houston-Galveston ozone nonattain-
ment area ("Houston SIP"). BCCA and Brazoria County opposed the
Houston SIP on the grounds that certain measures were too stringent and
in any event would fail to attain the NAAQS. BCCA also challenged
EPA's approval of the state's computer modeling and use of other analyt-
ical measures to demonstrate attainment. Brazoria County maintained
that components of the control strategy violated state law and that EPA's
approval of the measures was arbitrary and capricious. 12 Other petition-
ers claimed the Houston SIP did not go far enough in adopting measures
to achieve attainment by 2007. The court denied all of the petitions for
review. 13
7. Id.
8. Id. at 828.
9. Id. at 829-30.
10. The one exception is that the court reversed the portion of EPA's final action
approving the one-hour ozone SIP for the Beaumont/Port Arthur area (66 Federal Regis-
ter 26,914) that granted the area an extension of its attainment date from 1996 to 2007.
Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 314 F.3d 735, 745 (5th Cir. 2002).
11. BCCA Appeal Group, 355 F.3d at 817.
12. As noted previously, the court ruled Brazoria County waived these arguments by
failing to present them to EPA during the notice and comment period. Id. at 823-24.
13. Id. at 821.
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The court noted that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, it must
uphold EPA's findings, conclusions, and ultimate action unless they are
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law."' 14 The court instructed that this standard of review is
narrow and that a rule is arbitrary and capricious "only where the agency
has considered impermissible factors, failed to consider important aspects
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that is contrary to
the record evidence, or is so irrational that it could not be attributed to a
difference in opinion or the result of agency expertise."1 5 Furthermore,
"[a] reviewing court must be most deferential to the agency where, as
here, its decision is based upon its evaluation of complex scientific data
within its technical expertise. 1 6 The Fifth Circuit also applied the two-
step Chevron analysis to EPA's interpretation, and the court granted def-
erence to EPA's agreement here to the extent they involved the reasona-
ble resolution of ambiguities in the Clean Air Act.
The court found that EPA's decisions were not arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to law. 17 With respect to inaccuracies in the photochemical grid
models used for the attainment demonstration raised by BCCA, the court
was satisfied that EPA had considered BCCA's arguments during the ad-
ministrative process, that EPA was aware of the difficulties posed by the
model, and that EPA had provided a rational explanation for its reliance
on its model despite its imperfections.1 8
With respect to the petitioners' challenge that computer modeling
failed to demonstrate future attainment, the court found the statute was
ambiguous as to how such modeling may be used.19 Applying the Chev-
ron standard for judicial review of agency evaluation of statutory require-
ments, the court found the EPA's approach "reasonable" because the
statute granted EPA broad authority to approve equally effective alterna-
tives to the photochemical grid modeling, and EPA guidance expressly
authorizes the approach Texas uses.20 Likewise, the court rejected vari-
ous other legal and scientific challenges to the EPA's actions on the
Houston SIP.
b. Petition to Review EPA's Approval of the Beaumont/Port
Arthur SIP
Another significant case under the Clean Air Act involved a regional
plan to clean up polluted air, Sierra Club v. United States Environmental
14. Id. at 824 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)).
15. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)).
16. Id. (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NROC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
17. Id. at 821.
18. Id. at 833-34.
19. The statute requires that an attainment demonstration be "based on photochemi-
cal grid modeling," not that such model be the sole or direct basis of the attainment dem-
onstration. Id. at 835.
20. Id. at 834 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(A)).
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Protection Agency.21 In this case, the petitioners challenged EPA's final
action approving the State of Texas's SIP for the Beaumont/Port Arthur
area (Beaumont SIP).22 The Beaumont/Port Arthur area is a moderate
nonattainment area with respect to the one-hour ozone NAAQS. Peti-
tioners specifically challenged EPA's extension of the attainment dead-
line for the Beaumont area and its approval of the SIP without requiring
additional reasonably available control measures (RACM).
EPA had approved extending the attainment date for Beaumont from
November 16, 1996 (the statutory attainment date for moderate nonat-
tainment areas) to November 15, 2007 (the statutory attainment date for
the Houston/Galveston nonattainment area), which was consistent with
its 1999 policy allowing such extensions under certain conditions for mod-
erate or serious nonattainment areas downwind of areas that transport
ozone and interfere with the downwind area's ability to attain the
NAAQS.2 3 EPA reasoned that such downwind areas should not be pe-
nalized by being forced to adopt additional costly and onerous measures
to compensate for pollution transported from upwind areas when such
measures will become superfluous once the upwind area reduces its con-
tribution to the downwind area's pollution. EPA applied its extension
policy based on the state's modeling, which demonstrated that requiring
additional emission reductions in the Beaumont area would not acceler-
ate attainment of the one-hour ozone NAAQS because of the pollution
contribution from the Houston area.
The court analyzed the Clean Air Act provisions that specify when
EPA may extend attainment deadlines to account for upwind emissions
that jeopardize another area's attainment. The court found that applica-
tion of EPA's extension policy was contrary to congressional intent for an
area such as Beaumont, which has implemented a SIP and has failed to
meet its attainment deadline. 24 Accordingly, the court reversed EPA's
extension of the attainment deadline for the area.
The court affirmed the portion of the Beaumont SIP that includes as
potential RACM only those measures that would advance the attainment
date. Finding the Clean Air Act provisions ambiguous and EPA's con-
struction of the statute reasonable, the court deferred to EPA's conclu-
sion that potential measures requiring intensive and costly
implementation are not RACM because they cannot be readily
implemented.25
3. Petition to Review EPA's Approval of Texas's Title V Operating
Permit Program
In Public Citizen, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
21. Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 314 F.3d 735 (5th Cir. 2002).
22. 66 Fed. Reg. 26,914 (May 15, 2001).
23. Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 739.
24. Id. at 742-43.
25. Id. at 745.
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Agency, 26 the Fifth Circuit considered challenges to EPA's order 27 grant-
ing full approval to operating a permit program promulgated pursuant to
Title V of the Clean Air Act and to EPA's February 21, 2002 decision 2
not to issue notices of deficiencies related to four aspects of the Texas
Title V program.
a. Considerable Deference Afforded EPA's Review of the State's
Title V Program
In reviewing EPA's actions under the Administrative Procedure Act
and the U.S. Supreme Court's Chevron standards, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the Clean Air Act was ambiguous with respect to whether
Section 502(g) of the Act requires that EPA grant full approval to any
program that corrects interim deficiencies, or whether Section 502(d) pre-
vents EPA from granting full approval until a state has corrected all defi-
ciencies in the program, no matter how insignificant the deficiency is
thought to be or when EPA identifies the deficiency. 29 Thus, EPA's inter-
pretation was entitled to the deferential standards set forth in Chevron.
The Fifth Circuit held that EPA's interpretation was not "plainly erro-
neous," that it was entitled to "controlling weight," and that it was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.30 The court concluded that the language
in Section 502(g) suggests that the interim approval notice must identify
all of the changes required for full approval and that making such
changes triggers full approval. The court further concluded that this ap-
proach comports with the statutory approval timetables and that the
Clean Air Act provides a mechanism for correcting deficiencies in fully-
approved programs. The last conclusion indicates that the court believed
that all deficiencies need not be corrected prior to full approval.
The court also rejected the petitioners' challenge that EPA acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in granting full program approval when Texas had
not fully corrected three of the deficiencies identified at interim ap-
proval. 3 1 The court was satisfied that EPA had conducted a detailed,
technical evaluation of the revisions to the Texas program and concluded
that the program satisfactorily addressed EPA's concerns. 32 Thus, EPA's
interpretation of the Clean Air Act was given substantial deference. 33
26. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 343 F.3d 449 (5th Cir.
2003).
27. 66 Fed. Reg. 63,318 (Dec. 6, 2001).
28. 67 Fed. Reg. 16,374 (Apr. 5, 2002).
29. Pub. Citizen, Inc., 343 F.3d at 456-57.
30. Id. at 457.
31. Id. at 459-62.
32. Id.
33. The court also rejected the petitioners' alternative argument that the EPA was
required but failed to issue a notice of deficiency for Texas's failure to satisfy regulatory
requirements; the court found that Congress left the decision of whether and when to issue
a notice of deficiency and thus engage the formal enforcement mechanism to the adminis-
trator's discretion. Id. at 462-65.
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b. The Texas Audit Privilege Act Permitted Sufficient State
Enforcement Authority
One of the petitioners' claims in challenging the approval by EPA of
the Texas Clean Air Act's implementation of the federal Title V permit
program was directed at the alleged deficiencies created by the Texas En-
vironmental, Health, and Safety Audit Privilege Act.34 In its interim ap-
proval notice, EPA identified the Audit Privilege Act as potentially
preventing Texas from having adequate enforcement authority to imple-
ment the Title V operating permit program. Texas then amended the Au-
dit Privilege Act to eliminate immunity and privilege for criminal actions
and for violations that result in a serious threat to health or the environ-
ment. The amendments also eliminated immunity and privilege where
the violator obtained a substantial economic advantage. These amend-
ments were meant to clarify that the law would not sanction individuals
who report violations to government agencies, and that the privilege does
not impair access to information required by federal or state law to be
made available to government agencies.
Petitioners claimed that the amended Audit Privilege Act still prevents
adequate enforcement and appropriate penalties and improperly gives
audit reports privileged status. The court found the Act neither limited
declaratory or injunctive relief for violations disclosed by an audit, nor
provided immunity for criminal sanctions or serious violations.35 The
court also concluded that EPA reasonably determined that Texas's Audit
Privilege Act allows the State to consider appropriate factors in imposing
penalties.36 With respect to access to documents, the court determined
that the EPA was reasonably satisfied that the Audit Privilege Act allows
state employees to review information required to be made available
under state or federal law, including specifically any documents required
to be collected, maintained, or reported under the Texas Title V operat-
ing permit program.37
B. CHALLENGES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITING DECISIONS
1. Constitutional and Evidentiary Challenges
In addition to challenges of agency rulemaking, in several cases during
the Survey period petitioners contested agency decisions with respect to
permits issued under Texas environmental statutes. In Collins v. Texas
34. See id. at 461-62.
35. Id. at 462.
36. Id. Although the EPA interprets the Clean Air Act and the EPA's Part 70 regula-
tions to require state law to allow for consideration of the penalty factors in Section 113(e)
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) (compliance history, economic benefit, and the
seriousness of the violation), the court found that the EPA reasonably determined that the
Audit Privilege Act allowed Texas to consider the appropriate factors in assessing penal-
ties. Id.
37. Pub. Citizen, Inc., 343 F.3d at 462.
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Natural Resource Conservation Commission,38 a poultry company applied
to the TCEQ for a permit to change from a dry waste management sys-
tem to a wet waste management system, that involved lagoons as part of
an expansion of the poultry operation. An organic farmer, Collins, whose
farm was located near the poultry farm, requested a contested case hear-
ing to oppose the application. After considering Collins's submissions
and providing Collins with two opportunities to speak at public meetings,
the TCEQ denied the hearing request. Collins sought judicial review of
the decision in district court, which affirmed the TCEQ's decision and
held that Collins's due process rights had not been violated. Collins ap-
pealed the district court's decision and claimed that the commissioners of
the TCEQ erred in not providing findings of fact and conclusions of law
as part of their written decision.
The Austin Court of Appeals examined whether there was substantial
evidence to support the commission's determination and concluded that
there was substantial evidence to support the finding that Collins was not
an affected person. In reviewing the factual evidence, the court observed
that Collins's home was not close enough to the lagoons to be affected.39
Moreover, based on the affidavits of two engineers, the court concluded
that the environment around the poultry farm would in fact be positively
impacted by the change to a wet waste management system. 40
The court also found that Collins's due process rights had not been
violated. Although Collins predicted that the lagoons would constitute a
nuisance that would deprive him of property rights, the court pointed out
that such a nuisance would violate the terms of the proposed permit and
that "[miere speculation ... in the face of conflicting evidence about the
improved operation of the site under the permit does not deprive Collins
of protected liberty or property rights. ' 41 Thus, the court held that the
process afforded to Collins was sufficient. 42
Finally, the court found no error in the commission's failure to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law because, (1) Collins's failure to
complain in his motion for rehearing to the commission did not preserve
the issue, and (2) findings and conclusions were not required since the
determination of a hearing request was not a contested case hearing sub-
ject to the Texas Administrative Procedure Act.43
38. Collins v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 94 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2002, no pet.).
39. The court pointed out that Collins's property was not adjacent to the poultry com-
pany's property, and that although Collins's property is 590 feet from the poultry com-
pany's property at its closest point, Collins's home was approximately 1.3 miles from the
lagoons. Id. at 883.
40. Id. at 884-85.





2. Landfill Permit Upheld
In another case involving a judicial challenge of a TCEQ permitting
decision, Coalition for Long Point Preservation v. Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality,44 the court considered the TCEQ's grant of a
permit to build and operate a municipal landfill. In this case, a number of
parties sought and received a contested case hearing regarding the permit
application. The administrative law judge assigned to the case issued a
proposed decision in favor of granting the permit, which the commission-
ers of the TECQ adopted in pertinent part. The Coalition filed suit to
challenge the TECQ's order in state district court and then appealed the
district court's decision to uphold that order.
The Coalition alleged that six regulatory permit requirements had not
been met.4 5 Since the court was reviewing an administrative order fol-
lowing a contested case proceeding, the court examined each issue to de-
termine whether there was substantial evidence for the TECQ's
decision. 46 With respect to requirements concerning groundwater moni-
toring, proximity to a Holocene fault, subsidence measurements, and
floodplain analysis, the court found that, despite some conflicting evi-
dence, there was substantial evidence to support the TECO's decision.47
With respect to an analysis of the effect of excavation outside the landfill
footprint, the court found that such an analysis was not required, since
the TECQ assumed that the only excavation would be from within the
footprint of the landfill itself.48 With respect to drainage calculations, the
court found that the Coalition had not preserved the issue because, in its
motion for rehearing, the Coalition did not allege that the testimony con-
cerning drainage was erroneously admitted.49 Furthermore, the court
concluded that the testimony was reliable because there were other stud-
ies and testimony that indicated that the method for calculation was relia-
ble.50 Thus, the court upheld the trial court's decision to affirm the
TECQ's order.51
3. EPA Issuance of Stormwater Permits to Two Cities Upheld
In a case involving a dispute over EPA permitting decisions, City of
Abilene v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,52 two cities
challenged municipal stormwater permits EPA issued under the Clean
Water Act (CWA). The permits required the cities to implement pro-
grams to limit the introduction of pollutants into storm sewers that even-
44. Coalition for Long Point Pres. v. Tex. Comm'n on Enitl. Quality, 106 S.W.3d 363
(Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied).
45. Id. at 367.
46. Id. at 366.
47. Id. at 367-72.
48. Id. at 372.
49. Id. at 373.
50. Id. at 374-75.
51. Id. at 375.
52. City of Abilene v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 325 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2003).
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tually drain into waters of the United States. After the cities were denied
relief by EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, the cities sought review
by the Fifth Circuit. The cities claimed that EPA did not have the author-
ity to require a state or local government to regulate its residents in order
to receive a permit, that the permits required the cities to regulate third
parties within their boundaries according to federal standards in violation
of the Tenth Amendment, that certain educational provision in the per-
mits violated the First Amendment, and that the permits were arbitrary
and capricious.
The court dismissed each of the cities' arguments in turn. The court
examined the language of the CWA and concluded that the plain lan-
guage of the applicable section conferred broad authority to EPA, and
that the permit conditions were within EPA's discretion.53 With respect
to the Tenth Amendment argument, the court reasoned that although the
federal government may not compel state and local governments to im-
plement federal regulatory programs, the federal government may "per-
suade" state and local governments by offering them the choice between
complying with the federal scheme and not complying. "[I]f the alterna-
tive to implementing a federal regulatory program does not offend the
Constitution's guarantees of federalism, the fact that the alternative is
difficult, expensive, or otherwise unappealing is insufficient to establish a
Tenth Amendment violation. '54 In this case, the court reasoned that the
cities had a choice between the municipal permits and more stringent in-
dustrial permits. 55 Since the industrial permits did not exceed EPA's au-
thority, the choice EPA presented to the cities did not violate the Tenth
Amendment. 56 Similarly, the cities' First Amendment argument failed
because the cities were not compelled to implement the educational pro-
vision of the permits.57
The cities argued that EPA's decision was arbitrary and capricious be-
cause the cities would be responsible for discharges from third parties,
and the permit provisions required the cities to have the legal authority to
implement the plans. The court pointed out that EPA's Environmental
Appeals Board expressly provided that the cities would not be liable for
third-party discharges and that the cities enjoyed a considerable degree of
self-governance. The court also pointed out that the cities were not
claiming that they did not have the authority to implement the permit. 58
Thus, the court concluded that the permit requirements were not arbi-
trary and capricious.59 Since the court rejected all of the cities' argu-
ments, it denied their petition for review.60
53. Id. at 660-61.
54. Id. at 662 (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766
(1982)).
55. Id. at 652.
56. Id. at 662-63.
57. Id. at 663-64.
58. Id. at 664.
59. Id. at 664-65.
60. Id. at 665.
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4. Courts Rejected Takings Claims Against the TCEQ for Permitting
Decisions
In three cases, the TCEQ permitting activities or actions were chal-
lenged on the basis that property rights were being taken without just
compensation. In one case, Monk v. Huston,61 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a challenge of nearby landowners to a landfill permit
application submitted to the TCEQ. At the time of the appeal, the
TCEQ had not yet processed the application. While the challenge was
largely a procedural attack, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the challenge was
not ripe. The Fifth Circuit had addressed similar claims in a prior case.62
The guiding principles in both cases on ripeness was whether the issues
were fit for judicial review and what hardship the appealing party would
suffer if the court withheld its review. 63 The court further evaluated the
question under the following standard: "A case is generally ripe if any
remaining questions are purely legal ones; conversely, a case is not ripe if
further factual development is required. '64 The court concluded that no
deprivation of a property interest had yet occurred. Since the permit ap-
plication review procedure was still underway, the agency could deny the
permit, thereby mooting the challenge.65
Another constitutional challenge to the TCEQ permitting action was
made in FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Qual-
ity. In FPL, landowners argued that the agency's action constituted a
taking without just compensation in violation of the federal and state con-
stitutions. In this case, a landowner challenged the granting of a deep
injection well permit.66 The landowner claimed a property interest deep
into the subsurface. The Austin Court of Appeals considered the ques-
tion of whether the TCEQ's actions in granting the deep well injection
permit "impaired" those interests, assuming the landowner held such in-
terests, as the relevant section of the Texas Water Code provides.67 The
court deferred to and considered reasonable the agency's expertise in
concluding that the migration of injected material would not interfere
with the intended uses of the subsurface more than a mile below ground.
The landowner had failed to produce any evidence that the landowner
could not inject into the same formation after the injection by the permit
holder. This also proved to be decisive with respect to the landowner's
constitutional takings argument. The court concluded that despite the
granting of the permit, should the migration of chemicals in fact cause
61. Monk v. Huston, 340 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2003).
62. Id. at 282 (citing Smith v. City of Brenham, 865 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1989)). In the
cited case, a party brought a due process challenge to landfill permitting procedures before
the permitting process was complete. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.3d 583,
586 (5th Cir. 1987)).
65. Id. at 283.
66. FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003
Tex. App. LEXIS 1074, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 6, 2003, pet. denied).
67. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.051 (Vernon 2003).
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property damage, the landowner could sue the permittee.68 Thus, an ade-
quate remedy at law existed.
In the last case, Base Truck Lines, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Envi-
ronmental Quality, a landowner challenged an agency order requiring the
paving of portions of the landowner's trucking facility. 69 The landowners
challenged the TCEQ order as being so vague and ambiguous as to deny
due process of law. The court concluded the issue had not been raised in
the prior administrative or judicial process and dismissed the suit. The
second due process challenge of the penalty assessed against the land-
owner revolved around a letter from a legislator encouraging the TCEQ
to issue significant penalties. The court ruled that there was no evidence
of undue influence in the decision to assess a $2,500 penalty. The court
also upheld the evidence that the facility was causing a dust problem in
the area.
Finally, the court denied the takings claim. The court applied a rule of
constitutional law that the regulation must be "tantamount to a physical
taking." °70 The court's threshold question was whether all economically
viable use of the property was denied.71 The court ruled this was not the
case where the government orders property to be paved; this was a reme-
dial action, leaving value to the property.
III. TEXAS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT
A. GOVERNMENT INJUNCTION SHUTS DOWN SHAM
RECYCLING FACILITY
So-called recycling facilities have been the locus of much environmen-
tal contamination and environmental risk where the activities involve
mostly illegal disposal activities or "sham recycling." In the case of AAA
Natural Recycling, Harris County and the State of Texas obtained injunc-
tive relief to stop the delivery or disposal of wood wastes on two tracts of
land. The court concluded that the operation was nothing more than a
"sham recycling" operation that in essence served as a dump for wood
waste, despite the fact that the owner claimed it would be turned into
compost. 72
The owner of the facilities appealed the trial court's granting of an in-
junction prohibiting receipt of any additional waste at the two facilities.
The owner's first argument was that the recycling business was governed
by Chapter 332 of the Texas Administrative Code, not by the solid waste
regulations in Chapter 330. The owner's second argument was that even
68. FPL Farming Ltd., 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 5941, at *16. The court cited Section
27.104 of the Texas Water Code in reaching this conclusion.
69. Base Truck Line, Inc. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-02-00272-CV, 2003
Tex. App. LEXIS 5941, *1 (Tex. App.-Austin July 11, 2003, pet. dism'd).
70. Id. at *22.
71. Id. at *23 (stating the test as "whether any value remains in the property after the
governmental action").
72. Thumann v. Harris County, No. 14-02-00307-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8792
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2002, no pet.).
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
if the solid waste regulations apply, the composting exceptions relieve the
owner from those regulations. However, the court upheld the trial
court's finding that the facilities were not in fact recycling or composting
the wood materials. As much as 300,000 cubic yards of wood waste had
been placed at one of the facilities and Harris county officials testified
that no more than one to two percent of the material brought to the sites
had ever been ground into mulch.73
The temporary injunction was upheld based on the evidence presented
to prove the risk of harm arising from the large piles of wood waste being
accumulated at the facility. In addition, the appellate court reviewed the
lower court's findings that the operator did not have sufficient fire sup-
pression capability to quell a fire if it were to start. The court concluded
that Harris County had presented sufficient evidence to show the owner
or operator had violated Section 330 of the Texas Administrative Code
and that the continuing violations and the risk of allowing ongoing receipt
of wood waste was sufficient to allow the court to temporarily enjoin the
further delivery of wood waste to the site. The risk of fire was significant,
and the lack of adequate fire suppression capability made the site a signif-
icant concern to both the district and appellate courts.74
B. BAN ON INJUNCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE INTO SALT
DOMES UPHELD
Secured Environmental Management, Inc. v. Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission75 presents the question of whether the Federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) preempts Section
361.114 of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA), which bans
disposal of hazardous waste, solid or liquid, in solution-mined salt domes
or sulphur mines.76 Section 361.114 of the TSWDA was passed after Se-
cured Environmental Management, Inc. (SEM) applied for a permit to
dispose of hazardous waste in a solution-mined salt dome. In response to
this statutory prohibition, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) notified SEM that the TNRCC would not con-
sider SEM's permit application with respect to disposal of hazardous
waste in a solution-mined salt dome and requested that SEM revise its
permit application accordingly. SEM challenged the TNRCC's position
by seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 361.114 was preempted by
RCRA and an injunction preventing the statute's implementation. The
trial court held that RCRA did not preempt Section 361.114. 77 SEM ap-
pealed the decision.
Federal "preemption can be demonstrated explicitly or implicitly."'78
73. Id. at *8-9.
74. Id. at *13.
75. Secured Envtl. Mgmt., Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 97 S.W.3d
246 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
76. Id. at 248.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 252.
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Because RCRA does not explicitly preempt state regulation of hazardous
waste disposal in solution-mined salt domes, the Austin Court of Appeals
analyzed whether RCRA impliedly preempted the state statute. 79 When
assessing the implied preemptive effect of a federal statute over a state
statute, the court must determine "whether the statute is consistent both
with the federal statute's structure and purpose, taken as a whole, and its
objectives and policies." 80 In this case, the court considered "whether
'the practical impact' of Section 361.114 interferes with the goals and
methods of the RCRA.
81
RCRA provides that land disposal of hazardous waste, such as in solu-
tion-mined salt domes, poses substantial risk to human health and the
environment, and, therefore, should be the least favored method for man-
aging hazardous waste. Storage of fossil fuels in solution-mined salt
domes has shown that the formations are not stable. When the salt
moves, the walls crack, allowing whatever is contained inside to leach out
into the surrounding area. This danger is the reason that both the federal
and state governments have developed statutes that carefully limit this
type of hazardous waste management. 82 The RCRA creates an outright
ban on disposal of liquid hazardous waste in a set of geologic formations
including salt domes and a corresponding disapproval of solid waste dis-
posal in the same formations. The court agreed with SEM that RCRA's
different treatment of disposal of liquid and solid hazardous waste in un-
derground salt formations suggests the possibility that at some point
some hazardous waste may be safely disposed in some of the under-
ground geologic formations. 83 SEM, however, interpreted such recogni-
tion as the creation of a requirement that land disposal be a permissible
alternative in the waste disposal program under the authority of EPA or
the authorized states.
The court concluded that a statutory ban is within the scope of
RCRA's savings clause in Section 6926, which provides that states and
local governments "may not impose any requirements less stringent" than
those specifically set forth in RCRA, while explicitly authorizing state
governments to create regulations "more stringent" than those specifi-
cally set forth in RCRA.84 The court opined that "[i]f Congress has the
ability to regulate waste disposal by creating an outright ban on liquid
hazardous waste disposal in certain geologic formations, then Texas's
power to enact more stringent regulations, pursuant to the savings clause,
must include the ability to extend that ban in order to meet the same




82. Id. at 249-50.
83. Id. at 254.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 256.
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summary judgment for the TNRCC in SEM's declaratory judgment
action.
IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Since its enactment, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has been the
basis of much litigation. Landowners have attacked the statute, believing
that their constitutional rights were denied in government attempts to
control the use of their land or that the statute exceeded congressional
authority granted under the Constitution. In GDF Realty Investments,
Ltd. v. Norton,86 the Fifth Circuit was presented with a Commerce Clause
challenge to the take provision of the ESA. In the case, a number of
landowners had applied for an incidental take permit that would allow
them to develop their property for a number of uses. The United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) denied the permit and the property own-
ers filed suit against the FWS, claiming that the ESA take provision as
applied to the Cave species was unconstitutional. The district court
granted summary judgment for the FWS, holding that the take provision
was constitutional in this situation. The property owners appealed, claim-
ing that the taking of the Cave species had no relationship, let alone a
substantial one, to interstate commerce and that aggregation in this case
was improper because the taking of the Cave species was not economic or
an essential part of a regulatory scheme.
The Fifth Circuit chronicled the recent Supreme Court cases addressing
the scope of the Commerce Clause, paying close attention to the difficulty
associated with the aggregation principle, including what activity may be
aggregated in a Commerce Clause analysis. The court stated that the dis-
trict court had erred in finding a direct link to interstate commerce based
primarily on the property owners' commercial motivation, as "Congress,
through the ESA, is not directly regulating commercial development. '8 7
The Fifth Circuit then concluded that, considered alone, the taking of the
Cave species did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.88
Next, the court considered whether the taking of the Cave species
could be aggregated with the taking of all endangered species. Earlier,
the court had noted that "[o]ne way in which the regulated activity might
be economic is when . . . the intrastate activity is part of an economic
regulatory scheme which could be undercut but for the particular intra-
state regulation. '8 9 Relying on the legislative history of the ESA, the
court concluded that the ESA's protection of all endangered species was
economic in nature.90 Additionally, the court reasoned that the taking of
any individual species was an essential element of the entire federal
scheme of species protection, in part because of the interdependence of
86. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
87. Id. at 634.
88. Id. at 637-38.
89. Id. at 630 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
90. Id. at 639.
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all species.91 Thus, the court held that a taking of the Cave species could
be aggregated with all ESA takings in a Commerce Clause analysis and
that the ESA's taking provision as it related to the Cave species did not
exceed the scope of the Commerce Clause.92
In another ESA case in Texas, Sierra Club v. Veneman,93 the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered whether the Texas Red-Cockaded Woodpecker (RCW)
plan satisfied the requirements of the ESA. The plaintiffs alleged that the
RCW plan was arbitrary and capricious because it allowed clear-cutting
or even-aged management methods for timber production in National
Forests in Texas. The court pointed out that "[o]nly challenges to final,
specific agency action, such as a specific timber sale, are permissible. ''94
Additionally, the RCW plan required a site-specific evaluation before
clear-cutting would be allowed. Despite the fact that there may be disa-
greement over the best method for accomplishing an objective in the
RCW plan, that "does not mean that the Forest Service acts arbitrarily
when it must choose among competing alternatives. '95 Thus, the court
held that the RCW plan was not arbitrary and capricious, and that it met
the requirements of the ESA.96
V. ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS AND COST
RECOVERY CLAIMS
A. COST RECOVERY AND CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS UNDER
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
1. Right of Cost Recovery Under CERCLA Without First Being Sued
In a very significant Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case discussed in
last year's Survey, the ability of private parties to conduct investigation
and remediation of their property and then to recover the costs of those
actions from other liable private parties was upheld in an en banc deci-
sion reversing the earlier panel decision. Such "cost recovery claims," as
they have been called, have frequently been brought under Section 113 of
the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA). 97 The Fifth Circuit panel issued an opinion
that concluded the statutory language of CERCLA requires that plaintiff
may only file a cost recovery claim during or following the prosecution of
a CERCLA action against that plaintiff.98 The full en banc panel re-
versed this holding, and held that the plaintiff need not be a current or
former defendant in a CERCLA action to file a suit against other respon-
sible parties to recover the costs it has expended to remediate a contami-
91. Id. at 640.
92. Id. at 640-41.
93. Sierra Club v. Veneman, 273 F. Supp. 2d 764 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
94. Id. at 768 (citing Sierra Club v. Peterson, 204 F.3d 580 (5th Cir. 2000)).
95. Id. at 768-69.
96. Id. at 769.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2003).




The Fifth Circuit cited a list of opinions decided after the 1986 enact-
ment of Section 113 that it believed supported the conclusion that a plain-
tiff may file cost recovery claims under CERCLA without first being sued
or having a judgment rendered against the plaintiff. An earlier United
States Supreme Court decision considered the ability to bring a cause of
action under Section 113 and concluded that it was specifically al-
lowed. 100 Other Fifth Circuit opinions and other circuit courts of appeal
had similarly ruled that a contribution claim was allowed by parties with-
out first being a defendant in a CERCLA proceeding. The court in this
case concluded that the statutory language and legislative history sup-
ported the ability of private parties to bring suit without prior judicial
action against that party. 101
Finally, the court reviewed the policy implications of the panel's ruling.
The court believed the panel's ruling would have impeded the successful
implementation of CERCLA by not allowing responsible parties to move
forward voluntarily with remediation without first being sued such parties
could then file suit after completing mediation to allocate the costs in-
curred among other responsible parties.
B. TORT CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND
PERSONAL INJURY
Over the years, property damage claims and personal injury claims that
arise from alleged releases of contaminants or pollutants to the air, water,
or soil have grown in number. Several interesting cases during the Survey
period were handed down by state and federal courts.
1. Property Damage Claims
In Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc.,102 the plaintiffs, owners of the surface of a
large tract of grazing land, sued oil and gas well operators for contamina-
tion of their land. The trial court concluded that the injury to the land
was permanent and that the correct measure of damages was the diminu-
tion in value to the land. Because the jury found no diminution in value,
the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. The court of ap-
peals reversed the decision in part and remanded the cause for further
proceedings.
At trial, evidence was presented that the defendants violated Railroad
Commission regulations enacted to prevent the pollution of surface and
subsurface water, and the jury awarded $200,000 as reasonable costs to
99. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th. Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 981 (2004). This case has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and ac-
cepted for hearing.
100. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
101. Aviall Serv., Inc., 312 F.3d at 682.
102. Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc., No. 01-02-00461-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6550, at *1
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 31, 2003, no pet.).
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repair plaintiffs' property. The appellate court held that because the un-
contested evidence established that the damage to plaintiffs' land could
be remediated, the damage to the property was temporary. The
"[p]roper measure of damages for temporary injury to land is the cost of
restoration to its condition immediately preceding the injury.'10 3 "How-
ever, the diminution in fair market value is the measure to be applied
when the cost of restoration exceeds the diminution in fair market
value."10 4
The defendants argued that their unsolicited and unaccepted offer to
buy the property for its fair market value was proof that there was no
diminution in value of the land. The court found this argument to be
contrary to settled case law. The court found that Texas courts have long
held that unaccepted offers to purchase property are not evidence of the
fair market value of property. The court stated that such evidence is un-
certain and speculative and does not establish the good faith of the per-
son making the offer. The court held that there was no evidence to
support the jury's finding of no diminution in property value.10 5
2. Sufficiency of Evidence-Validity of Claims for Airborne
Particulates Under Texas Law
In Stevenson v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co.,'0 6 a rather unique
argument was made by the defendant, E. I. DuPont De Nemours and
Company (DuPont). A central part of the defense was that dispersion of
airborne particulates onto another person's property cannot serve as the
basis for a tort claim by the owner of that property. The plaintiffs in the
case brought suit and alleged that the defendant's plant emitted heavy
metal particulates that contaminated their properties and affected their
health and their animals' health. The plaintiffs sought recovery under
theories of negligence, nuisance, and trespass. The jury found for the
plaintiffs only on the trespass theory and awarded damages for the dimin-
ished value of the property. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
denial of DuPont's motion for judgment as a matter of law, but reversed
the jury's award for damages and remanded the case for a new trial on
damages. 107
On appeal, DuPont argued that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs could
not recover for trespass based on contamination by airborne particulates.
DuPont argued that trespass requires a showing of direct and physical
invasion by tangible matter onto another's property and that intrusion of
airborne particles was not a sufficient intrusion. DuPont further argued
that even if airborne particles were a sufficient intrusion, the plaintiffs
would still have to prove substantial damages to their properties. The
103. Id. at *12.
104. Id.
105. See id. at *12-20.
106. Stevenson v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2003).
107. Id. at 410.
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court found that DuPont's arguments failed for two reasons. First, be-
cause there was no assertion in the case that Texas law had set the re-
quired levels of contamination necessary for recovery, the plaintiffs were
not required to show substantial damage to their property. The court did
cite two cases where the state had set the minimum levels of damage
necessary to maintain a trespass cause of action, but distinguished these
cases from the case at hand. Second, the court concluded DuPont's argu-
ments failed under the current application of Texas law on trespass. The
court held that "[t]o constitute trespass there must be some physical entry
upon the land by some 'thing.' ... Because the only showing necessary is
entry over land by some 'thing,' Texas law would permit recovery for air-
borne particulates. '10 8
The second challenge concerned the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evi-
dence. The court held the plaintiffs were not required to rule out all
other potential causes of their damages, but were required only to show
that the defendant's emissions more probably than not landed on the
plaintiffs' properties. Testimony presented at trial showed that the emis-
sions from DuPont's factory were most heavily concentrated over the
plaintiffs' property and that their property showed evidence of heavy
metal contamination that was most likely airborne in nature. 10 9 With re-
gard to damages, the court held that the plaintiffs did not have the bur-
den of establishing that the trespass was temporary or permanent. In
absence of proof that repair is actually or economically feasible, the in-
jury may be deemed permanent. Because DuPont did not present any
evidence to support a temporary trespass or request a jury charge on the
issue, it was not error for the jury to consider only damages for perma-
nent trespass. However, the court vacated the damage award and re-
manded the case for a new trial on damages because the jury had been
presented with testimony only about the value for the property after
damages; no evidence on the value of the land before the trespass was
presented.110
C. FRAUD
In Nelson v. Najm,111 the plaintiff sued Philip and Carrie Nelson based
on Philip Nelson's alleged failure to disclose material information to
Najm prior to Najm's purchase of Nelson's gas station. In a bench trial,
the trial court awarded $100,000 plus pre-judgment interest and attor-
ney's fees to Najm. At the time of the purchase there were four under-
ground gasoline storage tanks and one underground waste oil storage
tank. The four gasoline tanks were registered with the TNRCC, now the
TCEQ, but the waste oil tank was not. Nelson disclosed the existence of
the gasoline storage tanks, but he did not disclose the existence of the
108. Id. at 406.
109. Id. at 408.
110. Id. at 409.
111. Nelson v. Najm, 127 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2003, no pet. h.).
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waste oil tank and told Najm that there was no need for testing. After
closing, Najm discovered soil contamination at the station.
With regard to Najm's claim for recovery based on common-law fraud,
the appellate court concluded that Nelson's failure to disclose the exis-
tence of the underground waste oil tank was a material omission. Nelson
did not verbally inform Najm about the tank nor did he disclose it on the
commercial property form. The court found that Nelson made an affirm-
ative misrepresentation when he told Najm that a property inspection
was not necessary. 1 2 The court further found that Nelson had a statutory
duty to disclose not only the existence of every tank on the property, but
also the regulations governing the tanks. 113 The "as-is" provision in-
cluded in the earnest money contract was deemed not to be valid because
Nelson concealed a known fact. 114 The appellate court upheld the trial
court's granting of contract rescission, finding that a general prayer for
relief will support any relief raised by the evidence that is consistent with
the allegations and causes of action in the petition and was within the
discretion of the trial court."
5
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Baylor Health Care System v. Maxtech Holdings, Inc.,116 Baylor
Health Care System (Baylor) sued Maxim Holdings, Inc. alleging that
Maxim negligently performed an environmental site assessment before
Baylor purchased the properties in 1991. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations. Baylor con-
tended the trial court erred in granting the motion, in holding that the
discovery rule did not apply, and in concluding that Baylor discovered, or
should have discovered, its injury more than two years prior to filing suit.
The parties disputed whether the discovery rule applied and, if applied,
when Baylor knew or should have known that its property was contami-
nated as a result of past dry cleaning operations. Baylor contended it
discovered the contamination when it discovered a contaminated sump
many years after it purchased the properties. Maxim contended that the
date of discovery was, at the latest, 1996 when it delivered a second envi-
ronmental site assessment report on an adjacent property to Baylor. The
second report expressed concern about contamination and the need for
additional investigation.
The court held that "assuming the discovery rule applied, the 1996 re-
port raised concerns over the environmental impact of the former dry
cleaning services. ' ' 1 7 Although the report did not identify per-
chlorotheylene as a solvent used in dry cleaning operations, Maxim rec-
112. Id. at 174-75.
113. Id. at 175.
114. Id. at 176.
115. Id. at 177.
116. Baylor Health Care Sys. v. Maxtech Holdings, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
117. Id. at 658.
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ommended additional testing and expressly stated that dry cleaning
solvents may have posed an environmental concern to the site. The court
found "that this alone should have put Baylor on notice that dangerous
contaminants could exist and would need to be cleaned up."118
E. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS
1. Exemplary Damages
Personal injury claims are also common in environmental tort suits.
During the Survey period, several interesting opinions were issued by ap-
pellate courts hearing Texas cases. In Brown & Root, Inc. v. Moore," 9
the estate of a steel mill employee brought a personal injury suit against a
corporation for exposure to asbestos. The employee worked at the steel
mill from 1977 to 1985. He worked around the furnaces while the corpo-
ration's employees removed insulation. The employee developed and
died from mesothelioma. The jury found that the corporation was par-
tially responsible and that the corporation acted with malice. Thus, the
estate was awarded exemplary damages. The corporation appealed,
claiming that there was no evidence supporting the malice determination
and that the exemplary damages were improper.
The court pointed out that malice has an objective prong and a subjec-
tive prong. 120 In examining whether the objective prong of malice had
been satisfied, the court pointed to trial evidence indicating that by the
1970s the risks of asbestos were well known.121 The court found the evi-
dence to be legally sufficient to conclude that the insulation removal,
viewed objectively from the corporation's perspective, involved an ex-
treme degree of risk.122 Regarding the corporation's subjective aware-
ness of the risk, the court pointed to a number of facts indicating that the
corporation was aware of the risk and had taken steps in other situations
to limit exposure to asbestos. 123 The court also cited the testimony of
corporation employees concerning the corporation's knowledge. 124 The
118. Id.
119. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied).
120. "Objectively, the defendant's conduct must involve an extreme risk of harm. Sub-
jectively, the defendant must have actual awareness of not just a risk, but of an extreme
risk created by the conduct." Id. at 851 (citing Celanese Ltd. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc.,
75 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied)).
121. The court cited trial testimony indicating that it was common knowledge as far
back as 1930 that asbestos products were a serious health risk, that it was accepted by 1949
that asbestos could cause lung cancer, that asbestos was linked to mesothelioma in approxi-
mately 1960, and that there were Texas and OSHA regulations issued in 1958 and 1972
respectively. Id. at 852.
122. Id.
123. For example, the corporation issued a memorandum regarding OSHA asbestos
regulations, the corporation performed asbestos monitoring at a number of sites other than
Lone Star Steel, and the corporation followed stringent asbestos safety rules when working
for another client. Id. at 853.
124. Testimony from the corporation's health, safety, and environmental manager and
from one of the corporation's industrial hygiene technicians indicated that the corporation
was aware that furnace thermal insulation often contained asbestos, that there were regula-
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court held that there was sufficient evidence to find that the corporation
had subjective knowledge of the risks of exposure to asbestos. 2 5 Addi-
tionally, the court pointed to testimony of the highest ranking supervisor
at the steel mill site who indicated that he was aware that asbestos could
cause health problems and that the corporation had not taken any steps
to determine if asbestos was present or to prevent the steel mill employ-
ees from exposure to asbestos.126 The court found that the actions of the
supervisor alone were sufficient evidence for the jury to find malice on
the part of the corporation. 2 7 Thus, the court upheld the jury's finding of
malice and the exemplary damages award.
2. Review of Expert Testimony Causation Evidence
In another personal injury case, Daniels v. Lyondell-Citgo Refining
Co.,128 the family of a refinery worker, Daniels, filed a wrongful death
action against the refinery. The family claimed that the refinery improp-
erly and negligently released a known carcinogen, benzene, into Daniel's
work environment, causing Daniels to develop bronchial alveolar cancer.
The refinery owners filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment
on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not provided any evidence that ben-
zene causes bronchial alveolar cancer in humans. The trial court granted
the refinery owners' motion, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The court pointed out that unless the plaintiffs could produce more
than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the
issues of general and specific causation, the trial court's ruling would
stand.'2 9 To support their contention that occupational exposure to ben-
zene causes lung cancer, the plaintiffs presented testimony from two ex-
perts and relied on three epidemiological studies.130 Following the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hav-
ner,'3' the court examined the underlying data to evaluate whether the
evidence was reliable. For the epidemiological studies, the court utilized
the standard enunciated in Havner that "doubling of the risk" would sat-
isfy the no-evidence standard of review and the "more likely than not"
burden of proof.132 The court noted that none of the studies proffered by
the plaintiffs demonstrated that the risk of lung cancer doubled based on
occupational exposure to benzene.133 Thus, the court concluded that the
tions concerning exposure to asbestos, and that there were risks associated with exposure
to asbestos. Id. at 853-54.
125. Id. at 855-56.
126. Id. at 854-55.
127. Id. at 855-56.
128. Daniels v. Lyondell-Citgo Ref. Co., 99 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.).
129. Id. at 725.
130. Id. at 726, 730.
131. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
132. Daniels, 99 S.W.3d at 727 (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717-18).
133. Id. at 728-29.
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plaintiffs had not presented any evidence of general causation. 134 Since
the court found no evidence of general causation, the court declined to
address the issue of specific causation and affirmed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment.13 5
In a second personal injury case reviewing causation evidence, the
court in Exxon Corp. v. Makofski136 also relied on the Havner decision.
In Makofski, several hundred people sued alleging that they suffered va-
rious health ailments resulting from exposure to benzene via a contami-
nated water supply. The water supply had been contaminated by a leak
from an oil and gas well. Four adults and two children were selected for
the bellwether trial. The jury found Exxon negligent and grossly negli-
gent and awarded approximately $7 million in actual and punitive dam-
ages. However, the trial court rendered take nothing judgments for the
four adults and reduced the judgments for the two children. Both sides
appealed.
Exxon challenged the opinions of the plaintiffs' experts, claiming that
they did not establish a basis for finding that the exposure caused the
plaintiffs' ailments. The appellate court examined the trial record, addi-
tional materials, and studies provided at the court's request. The court
first examined the evidence related to acute lymphocytic leukemia
(ALL). With respect to two studies, the court found that the risk of de-
veloping ALL due to exposure to benzene was not statistically significant
under the Havner standard, i.e., the risk was not doubled. 137 With respect
to another study that barely demonstrated risk doubling, the court
pointed out that the authors of the study concluded that the results were
spurious because of the historical difficulty in distinguishing ALL from
other leukemias. 13 8 The court found that other evidence did not establish
a link between benzene and ALL.139 The court declined to consider
other studies mentioned in expert testimony at the trial level because the
court did not have the studies available to it.140 The court also discounted
an Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)1 41 study
on the subdivision in which the plaintiffs lived in large part because the
study did not contain or claim to contain any findings regarding ALL and
benzene. 142 With respect to the experts proffered by the plaintiffs, the
court discounted their testimony because it was not based on any pub-
134. Id. at 730.
135. Id.
136. Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
pet. filed).
137. Id. at 183-84.
138. Id. at 184.
139. The court found that two studies did not provide any statistical information con-
cerning ALL, in one case because the "study found a significant association between ALL
and other lymphatic leukemias with exposure to benzene and other solvents." Id. at 184-
85.
140. Id. at 185.
141. "The ATSDR is a division of the federal Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices that gathers health information on persons exposed to hazardous substances." Id.
142. Id. at 185-87.
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lished, peer-reviewed studies and was inconsistent with the many pub-
lished, peer-reviewed epidemiological studies.143
With respect to the other diseases complained of, the court did not find
any reliable scientific evidence to connect benzene to the diseases.1 44
Additionally, the jury had made awards for future pain, impairment, and
medical care, but awarded nothing for past damages. 145 The court rea-
soned that the jury had not based their awards on diseases exhibited to
date. 146 Since Texas law prohibits recovery for future diseases without a
reasonable medical probability that the disease will occur,147 and since
the court did not find any legally sufficient evidence to tie benzene to a
future disease, the court reversed the jury's award. 14 8
The jury had also awarded damages for mental anguish to some plain-
tiffs, although they had awarded nothing for the other claims. 149 The
court pointed out that Texas law does not allow recovery of "mental
anguish damages for fears related to developing a disease that has not
occurred and has not been shown to be likely .... ,"150 Thus, the court
upheld the trial court's order setting aside the mental anguish awards. In
sum, the court declined to "rush to impose liability when scientifically
reliable evidence is unavailable,' 51 and decided that the plaintiffs would
receive no damages. 152
The dissent in this case asserted that the trial court's decision should be
upheld. The dissent argued that the trial judge had determined the relia-
bility of the scientific evidence in a pre-trial hearing.1 53 Additionally,
since there was not a record of the pre-trial hearing, the dissent argued
that no error had been presented for the court to consider. 154 The major-
ity responded that the dissent had confused the legal sufficiency challenge
with an admissibility challenge; 55 the majority determined that Havner
requires that both the admissibility and the legal sufficiency of expert tes-
timony be determined by the same guidelines of relevance and reliability,
although the standards of review are different.
143. Id. at 187-88.
144. Id. at 189.
145. Id. at 188.
146. Id. at 189.
147. Id. at 190.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 191.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 192-94 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 197-98 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 181-82.
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VI. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
A. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR "PASSIVE MIGRATION" OF
CONTAMINANTS IN GROUNDWATER IS NOT PERMISSIBLE
In L.B. Foster Co. v. State, a company, L.B. Foster, challenged its con-
victions for knowingly disposing of a hazardous waste and knowingly dis-
posing of used oil on its land.156 One of the major issues in the case was
the question of whether a criminal violation continued as long as con-
taminants released from a prior action on a particular date or dates mi-
grated through the soil. This theory has been raised in a variety of federal
environmental statutory claims for cost recovery by governmental entities
and private parties. Although this theory has been rejected in the crimi-
nal context, the remaining question is whether the theory will ultimately
be rejected by Texas courts in the context of governmental claims or pri-
vate party attempts to recover expenses incurred in investigating and
remediating contaminated properties.
On its site, L.B. Foster cuts and threads pipe and cuts rails for railroad
companies. From December 30, 1997 to February 18, 1998, Houston po-
lice officers and environmental investigators made a number of visits to
the site and observed various conditions, including: oil on the ground
under hydraulic roller machines, leaking hydraulic hoses on various ma-
chines, blackened and/or stained soil, tipped over buckets of black sludge,
open buckets of hydrocarbon fluids, and oil in the sewer. On July 24,
2000, the State indicted L.B. Foster for knowingly disposing of a hazard-
ous waste and knowingly disposing of used oil on its land, both in viola-
tion of the Texas Water Code. The jury found L.B. Foster guilty on both
counts, and the trial court denied L.B. Foster's motion for a new trial.
L.B. Foster appealed, challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence of
the hazardous waste conviction and challenging the used oil conviction on
a number of grounds.
In examining the legal sufficiency of the evidence of hazardous waste
conviction, the court first noted that while there was adequate circum-
stantial evidence to indicate that there had been disposal of hazardous
waste, the evidence did not indicate that disposal had taken place within
the three year statute of limitations. 157 As an alternate theory, the State
argued that L.B. Foster continued to passively (i.e., without human con-
tact) dispose of the hazardous waste as long as the contamination mi-
grated through the soil-a theory referred to as "passive migration. 158
Thus, the court examined whether the term "disposal" since in the statute
included passive migration. The court reasoned that since the term "dis-
posal" is not defined in the Water Code, it would look to a technical
meaning in the context of other environmental statutes. The parties
156. L.B. Foster Co. v. State, 106 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref'd).




adopted "polarized positions" on issue of the scope of the term so the
court looked to other statutes for guidance. 159 Specifically, the court ex-
amined two statutes with similar definitions of disposal-the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA) and CERCLA. The court noted that the
TSWDA defined disposal in terms of active verbs that require affirmative
human conduct. 160 Unfortunately, the court was unable to find any judi-
cial guidance in Texas on passive migration in this context.161 On the
other hand, the court pointed out that a number of CERCLA cost recov-
ery and enforcement actions considered passive migration. 162 However,
the court discounted the applicability of these cases because all were civil
cases based on a strict liability statute, while the case at hand was a crimi-
nal case based on a statute with an intentional or knowing mental state
requirement. 163 Furthermore, unlike the present case, none of the CER-
CLA cases involved passive migration in the context of a statute of
limitations.164
In fact, the court found only one case in any jurisdiction involving a
criminal conviction based on passive migration under a similar statute. In
that case, a Colorado appellate court reasoned that construction of the
term "disposal" to include passive migration is inconsistent with the exis-
tence of a statute of limitations because there would be no method to
accurately determine when the limitations period started. 65 The court
agreed with the reasoning of the Colorado court and held that, in criminal
cases, the term "disposal" under Water Code subsection 7.162(a)(2) did
not include passive migration.' 66 "As a corollary to the passive migration
theory, the State asserted that L.B. Foster committed a continuing of-
fense.' 67 However, the court noted that the legislature had foreclosed
that possibility by providing that each day of illegal disposal constituted a
separate offense, not a continuing offense. 168 Thus, the court held that
the evidence presented was not legally sufficient to sustain the hazardous
waste conviction. 169
With respect to L.B. Foster's challenge to the used oil conviction, the
court held that there was legislative intent to include corporations within
the definition of person for purposes of prosecuting Water Code viola-
tions,' 70 that the term "directly" in the statute distinguished between mix-
ing of used oil with solid waste before disposal and disposal of used oil by
159. Id. at 202-03.
160. Id. at 204.
161. Id. at 202.
162. Id. at 205-06.
163. Id. at 206.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 206-07.




170. Id. at 208.
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itself (i.e., directly), 17 1 and that therewas no error in the jury charge. 1 72
Thus, the court upheld the used oil conviction.173
VII. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
After reauthorization of the TCEQ during the last legislative session,
the 78th Legislative Session was relatively quiet with regard to new envi-
ronmental statutes. Nevertheless, there were a couple of new environ-
mental programs enacted during the session.
A. MUNICIPAL SETTING DESIGNATIONS
One of the most significant environmental developments was the pas-
sage of House Bill 3152, authorizing the TCEQ and local governments to
create municipal setting designations (MSDs). The bill offers developers,
lenders, real-estate professionals, and property owners new opportunities
to return environmentally impacted properties to productive use in a
shorter time frame and at lower cost. The legislation authorizes the crea-
tion of MSDs for properties within the corporate limits or extraterritorial
jurisdiction of municipalities that have a population of at least 20,000 and
that have public drinking water supplies.1 74 The MSD application pro-
cess allows an individual, company, or a local governmental entity to ap-
ply to the TCEQ for an MSD. Before an MSD can be certified, the
municipality containing the proposed MSD must restrict the potable use
of groundwater in the proposed MSD area by ordinance. 175 Individuals
are authorized to restrict potable use of groundwater on individual
properties by deed restrictions enforceable by the municipality containing
the property, provided that the municipality passes a resolution support-
ing the designation. 176
Once an MSD is established, parties responsible for contaminated
properties within the MSD will no longer have to consider the risks asso-
ciated with human consumption of the contaminated groundwater in de-
veloping a response action to address the contamination. 77
Consequently, groundwater remediation costs, which are most often
driven by the requirement to achieve drinking water quality, should be
greatly reduced or eliminated. The creation of MSDs should also expe-
dite the issuance of VCP certificates of completion for MSD properties.
B. DRY CLEANER FUND
The dry cleaner legislation creates a fund to remediate dry cleaner fa-
cilities that use dry cleaning solvents, including perchloroethylene and/or
171. Id. at 209-10.
172. Id. at 210-13.
173. Id. at 213.
174. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.803 (Vernon 2003).
175. Id. § 361.8065.
176. Id.
177. Id. § 361.808.
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non-aqueous solutions. The new law requires the TCEQ to promulgate
rules requiring certain performance standards for new dry cleaning oper-
ations, and for older facilities to retrofit those performance standards.
Smaller operations with annual gross receipts of $200,000 or less may be
exempt. 178
The primary thrust of the legislation is the dry cleaner fund for com-
pleting corrective action at contaminated dry cleaning facilities. To pro-
vide monies for the fund, dry cleaning facilities must pay an annual
registration fee depending on the type of cleaning method and annual
gross receipts.179 In addition, fees are imposed on the purchase of dry
cleaning solvents. The fee does not apply to an owner who has never
used or allowed the use of perchloroethylene at a facility in Texas or to
the purchase of carbon dioxide solvents. 180
Dry cleaning facilities had the opportunity to opt-out of the fund pro-
gram, including the fees, by January 1, 2004. To opt-out, the facility
owner must have demonstrated that it never used or allowed the use of
perchloroethylene at any dry cleaning facility in Texas and the owner
must have agreed that perchloroethylene will not be used at the facility.
Owners of nonparticipating facilities are not eligible for any expenditures
of money from the fund or other benefits, and the facility is prohibited
from later becoming a participating facility. 181 Nonparticipating facilities
may be subject to a bonding requirement.182
The TCEQ is required to prioritize contaminated dry cleaning sites by
ranking facilities that do not require emergency action.' 83 The statute
also authorizes the TCEQ to hold an owner responsible for all of the
costs of corrective action for several reasons, including when an owner
has caused a release by using substandard operating practices.' 84 The
owner of a facility, or the applicant for ranking, must pay as a deductible
the first $5,000 of corrective action costs, and the TCEQ is prohibited
from using fund money for costs in excess of $5 million for corrective
action at a single contaminated dry cleaning site. 185 Under the new law,
the TCEQ may evaluate several factors in determining whether correc-
tive action at a dry cleaning site is complete, including the benefits of
additional corrective action, degree of harm to humans, and costs. 186
Other than property damage included in a corrective action plan ap-
proved by the TCEQ, fund money may not be used to compensate third
parties for bodily injury or property damage caused by a release. 87 If an
owner or other person is eligible to have corrective action costs paid by
178. Id. § 374.053.
179. Id. § 374.102.
180. Id. § 374.103.
181. Id. § 374.104.
182. Id. § 374.105.
183. Id. § 374.154.
184. Id. § 374.202.
185. Id. § 374.203.
186. Id. § 374.054.
187. Id. § 374.205.
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the fund, then an administrative or judicial claim cannot be made under
state law against the owner or other person, by the state, or by any other
person (except a political subdivision) to compel corrective action or seek
recovery of the costs of corrective action that result from the release. 188
The statute authorizes the fund through September 1, 2021,189 but dis-
bursements from the fund for corrective action are not authorized until
January 1, 2005.
C. OTHER LEGISLATION
In addition to the MSD and Dry Cleaner Fund programs, the legisla-
ture passed the following environmental bills during the 78th Legislative
Session:
* House Bill 2546 modifies the state's sludge program by modifying
the requirements and increasing restrictions for companies that
land apply Class B sludge, including a more comprehensive tracking
system and additional notice and permit application
requirements. 190
* House Bill 44 expands the scope of the advisory panel for the Small
Business Stationary Source Assistance Program to allow the panel
to advise the TCEQ storm water programs that affect small busi-
nesses. The program is now known as the Small Business Compli-
ance Assistance Program.191
* Senate Bill 1272 exempts from the contested case hearing process
certain concrete batch plants constructed to satisfy more stringent
environmental standards contained in a the TCEQ general permit.
If the standard permit applies, only a public meeting would be re-
quired as part of the permitting process. 192
" House Bill 555 clarifies that a portable facility relocated to a loca-
tion that contained a portable facility permitted by the TCEQ
within the previous two years is exempt from the notice and con-
tested case hearing requirements of the Texas Clean Air Act.
House Bill 555 also prohibits the TCEQ from issuing permits, per-
mit amendments, or other authorization for certain portable facili-
ties and rock-crushing facilities.193
* House Bill 1287 modifies the law to prohibit, under certain circum-
stances, the operation of a concrete crushing facility within 440
yards of a building used as a single or multifamily residence, school,
or place of worship. 194
188. Id. § 374.207.
189. Id. § 374.253.
190. Id. § 361.121.
191. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.135 (Vernon 2003).
192. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 382.05198, 382.05199 (Vernon 2003).
193. Id. § 382.056.
194. Id. § 382.065.
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* The Texas Emissions Reduction Plan (TERP), established in 2001,
created incentive programs to assist in reaching attainment by 2007.
House Bill 1365 generally modifies the TERP program to allow for
a more efficient program.195
* Senate Bill 934 provides some circumstances under which the
TCEQ will accept a company's inhouse or on-site laboratory
services.196
* House Bill 567 enacts a number of changes to the statute regulating
low-level radioactive waste, including provisions that restrict the
sites suitable for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste and re-
quirements for the application process of disposing radioactive
waste.
197
• House Bill 3030 requires the TCEQ to notify by mail owners of
private drinking water wells that may be contaminated within thirty
days of knowing about contamination that may impact their
wells. 19 8
VIII. CONCLUSION
This survey of Texas environmental cases includes some significant le-
gal holdings of which environmental practioners should be aware. The
continuing variety and number of environmental cases being heard each
year by state and federal courts indicates that the importance of environ-
mental laws and issues has not waned in an era not thought by some as a
time of significant governmental enforcement of environmental laws.
Private party disputes over property contamination and personal injury
claims appear to continue apace. In addition, the Texas legislature
adopted significant new environmental legislation, including legislation
creating the municipal settings Designation Program and the Dry Cleaner
Remediation Fund.
195. See id. at Chapter 386.
196. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.127 (Vernon 2003).
197. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 401.201 (Vernon 2003).
198. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.408 (Vernon 2003).
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